

Patchy Policies: The Cuban Embargo and the Gaza Blockade

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Although geographic, economic, and ideological distinctions exist between the Gaza Strip and Cuba, both territories share a common policy imposed on them by Israel and the U.S: enduring economic sanctions in the form of an embargo for Cuba and a blockade for Gaza aimed at deposing the incumbent regimes by creating economic hardship. The aim of this research paper is to provide an explanation on why the policies of blockade in Gaza and embargo in Cuba have failed to weaken and/or oust the regimes. Despite numerous differences between both territories, the outcome delivered by the sanctions has been equal: they have failed to weaken and/or oust the target states.

This essay will begin with a brief introduction on the Gaza Strip and Cuba, covering the alleged reasons by the sanctioning states on the target ones and the characteristics of both the blockade and the embargo. Three arguments will be presented to answer the above-stated question that will disclose why the embargo and the blockade have failed to weaken and overthrow the regimes. They will show that the sanctions have failed because the Hamas and Cuban regimes have exploited the sanctioning policies through a process of delegitimization. First, the incumbent regimes have explained to their peoples that the country's economic problems are a result of the sanctions, that Hamas and Cuba have found alternative channels to obtain resources, and finally that there have been enduring international efforts to further delegitimize the sanctions.

The Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip, one of the most densely populated territories, lies on the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, bordering Egypt on the southwest and Israel on the south, east and north. It was under foreign administration – Egyptian then Israeli – from 1948 until 1994 when it came under the direction of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) until 2006. The Strip is currently under Hamas rule. Hamas was founded in the late 1980s during the First Intifada. During the Second Intifada, it emerged as the most active actor against Israel, employing such methods as suicide bombings. In February 2005 the Israeli government voted on a unilateral disengagement from the Gaza

Strip. By September 2005 all Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel left while Israeli citizens were evicted. In January 2006 a Palestinian legislative election was held, in an electoral victory for Hamas, which were described by human rights organizations as free and fair.

Preceding the blockade was a series of economic sanctions imposed against the Palestinian Authority by Israel and the Quartet on the Middle East, which comprised of the U.S., Russia, the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) as a result of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory. The purpose of the sanctions was to force Hamas to "...satisfy the three conditions imposed by Israel and other countries: to recognize Israel's permanent right to exist, to forswear violence and to accept the validity of previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements, which are based on the concept of a two-state solution as the foundation stone for a peace treaty."¹ The sanctions consisted in withholding tax revenues collected in the Palestinian territories by Israel, U.S. banking restrictions, interrupting international aid to the Palestinian National Authority and restrictions by Israel of movement of goods within the Palestinian territories and outside of it. However, in June 2007 Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza by force, effectively taking absolute political control. Consequently, Israel and the U.S. reestablished relations with the West Bank Fatah-run government while augmenting sanctions on the Hamas-controlled territory of Gaza by imposing a near-total economic blockade.

The purpose of the Israeli blockade has been to remove Hamas from office. To achieve this end, the Israeli administration has sought to prevent Hamas from effectively ruling by denying them access to resources while asphyxiating all economic activity, in the hope that it will lead to social and political upheaval. Nonetheless, the result has been the reverse: Hamas has been isolated, has unjustly annulled elections enabling it to further entrench its power while gaining popularity as a resilient movement against the Israeli occupation. Carol Migdalovitz unambiguously describes the objectives and outcome of the blockade as a "...tight land, sea and air blockade on the Gaza Strip...With the blockade, Israel...hoped to turn Gazans against Hamas by contrasting Hamas rule with the better life of the Pal-

estinians in the West Bank. Instead, the blockade isolated the territory and helped strengthen Hamas's control."²

The Republic of Cuba

Cuba, strategically located in the Caribbean with a population of 11 million, has been governed by a socialist totalitarian regime led by Fidel Castro since revolutionary triumph in 1959. The U.S. imposed embargo was enacted partially in October 1960, and strengthened in February 1962. The imposition of the embargo was a result of two policies adopted by Castro: 1) the nationalization of assets and properties owned by US corporations and citizens, and 2) the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the embargo was codified into law with the enactment of the Cuban Democratic Act in 1992 and further strengthened with the Helms-Burton Act.

The underlying principle of the embargo – as in Gaza – was to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime. Sussane Gratus accurately summarizes US policy since Castro's rise to power: "Since the sixties, US policy towards Cuba has had two aims: 1) to cause the fall of Fidel Castro's regime, 2) to establish a liberal democracy and a market economy on the island."³ In order to achieve these two goals, successive US governments have used an arsenal of instruments including diplomatic pressure and isolation, fostering opposition movements within Cuba, sponsoring violent anti-Castro movements such as Alpha 66 and the suspension of diplomatic relations. However, the American "economic and financial embargo...continues to be the key part of its policy towards its neighboring country."⁴ The objective of the sanctions – again, as in Gaza – was to deny the Cuban regime of effective rule by preventing them access to resources, which would erode regimes legitimacy, provoking an economic crisis followed by a social upheaval. Former Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lester D. Mallory pertinently defines the embargo's objective:

Most Cubans support Castro.... the only foreseeable means to alienate internal support is by creating disillusionment and discouragement based on lack of satisfaction and economical difficulties... We should immediately use any possible measure to.... cause hunger, desperation and the overthrow of the Government.⁵

As observed, Cuba and Gaza share, despite distinctions

in the technicalities of the policies and deep political and geographic differences, an identical burden with an equal objective: foreign economic sanctions intended to depose the ruling regimes. In the section below I will argue how the policies have failed to weaken and oust the incumbent regimes.

First, the blockade and embargo have failed due to the internal delegitimization campaigns promoted by the target regimes against the sanctions. These campaigns insist that the country's economic woes are a result of the sanctions. This victimized rhetoric on the country's economic problems and the inability to deliver the population has resulted in increased political support for the regimes rather than turning the populations against the incumbent regimes as sanctioning states had intended. In Cuba, according to Cuban Foreign Affairs minister Bruno Rodriguez "the direct economic damage inflicted on the Cuban people by the implementation of the blockade over the last 50 years amounts to more than \$751 billion dollars."⁶ This economic damage has been caused by the loss of earnings due to the obstacles to the development of services and exports, restrictions on Cuban purchases in the United States, the limitation imposed on the growth of the national production of goods and services (limited access to technologies), denial of Cuba's access to international credit and to integration in international financial regulations, exclusion of third-nation ships from U.S. ports, and the U.S. travel ban.⁷ Moreover, although the Cuban regime has been credited with having been able to establish a nation-wide free healthcare service, there are medical shortages which Cuban authorities blame on the embargo by using propaganda billboards in highly congested areas stating: "12 hours of blockade are equivalent to all the necessary insulin for the country's sixty-four thousand patients."⁸

Also, a "brain drain" has been emphasized by the Cuban leadership due in part to the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1996 – first implemented in 1966 – which is "a special procedure under which Cuban natives or citizens...get a green card permanent residence if they have been present in the United States for at least 1 year, they have been admitted or paroled and they are admissible as immigrants."⁹ The CAA, essentially known as the "wet foot, dry foot policy" allows Cubans reaching U.S. soil, but not water to obtain the treasured green card. This policy has had a double effect. First and foremost, it has "encouraged" Cubans to migrate, mainly illegally, by speed- and homemade boats allowing many Cubans to prosper in the U.S., but has also

resulted in thousands dying in the strait of Florida. Secondly, it has given Fidel Castro another pretext to attack the embargo by attributing blame on the death and flight of Cubans: “The government of the United States should repeal the murderous Cuban Adjustment Act, which has cost the lives of so many women, children, old people and other citizens of Cuba, and continues to do so.”¹⁰ The Castro regime, in a biased fashion and through state-run media, exploits the humane and economic losses that the migration causes as a result of the CAA in turn gaining sympathy and undermining the embargo. Moreover, although the state provides each Cuban with a monthly food staple at an artificially low price, food is expensive due to a shortage in supply. Jorge Dominguez cogently articulates the ineffectiveness of the embargo and its effect on food:

“Most helpful to Cuban hardliners has been the so-called Cuban Democracy Act... The acts only significant measure has been to mandate penalties on U.S. firms whose third country subsidiaries trade with Cuba... Since that trade was mostly in foodstuffs, Cuban leaders now find it easier to blame food shortages on Washington.”¹¹

These negative consequences affecting the Cuban people have allowed the brilliant orator of Fidel Castro, for over 50 years in Cuba’s state-run media, to blame the U.S. for the economic woes: “I want to remind you... of a basic ethical principal related to Cuba: any injustice, any crime in whatever time has no excuse to go on. The cruel blockade (embargo) against the Cuban people costs lives, costs suffering.”¹² Thus the Cuban population has been the primary victim while the regime has benefitted politically by using the embargo as a holistic justification for the country’s woes. A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate explicitly described the futile outcome of the embargo:

According to several analysts, the complete ban on U.S. trade and financial transactions with Cuba from the 1960s to the present allowed the Castro government to use the external threat posed by the United States to win additional popular support. In addition, as a visible symbol of U.S. hostility, the sanctions made it possible for Castro to justify building a large military and establishing tight political controls on Cuban society.¹³

Similarly, in Gaza, the blockade imposed by Israel “has ‘locked in’ 1.5 million people...triggering a protracted human dignity crisis with negative humanitarian consequences.”¹⁴ Gaza experiences a collective punishment which has negatively affected in all aspects of livelihood: over 40 percent of Gaza’s workforce is unemployed, approximately 75 percent of Gaza’s population is food insecure and some 90 percent of the population experiences scheduled electricity cuts.¹⁵ For instance, the livelihoods of many Gazans has been severely affected as a result of the 3-mile limit, who has seen how their fishing catch dropped from 3,650 metric tonnes in 1999 to 1,525 metric tonnes in 2009, while figures indicated that during 2010 the decline in fishing catch would continue.¹⁶ Moreover, the blockade has resulted in the near total collapse of Gaza’s private sector. About 95 percent of industrial establishments (3,750) have either been forced to close or were destroyed over the past four years, resulting in a loss of 100,000 to 120,000 jobs.¹⁷ The Gaza population, like the Cuban, has been the principal casualty of the economic hardship inflicted by the blockade, resulting in increased support for the Gaza regime and augmented criticism of Israel. Despite this, Hamas does not enjoy full support of the population. As Dr. Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, rightly says:

“Overall, the blockade helped Hamas... (because) people anywhere tend to rally around their government when they are under military or economic attack... (And) Gazans resent the attempt at strangulation and provide greater support to Hamas... further radicalized... against Israel.”¹⁸

Despite dreadful living conditions, 37 percent seeking immigration from Gaza, and the lack of economic resources by the government, PSR Ramallah statistics illustrate that Dr. Eland’s claim holds value: a recent “positive evaluation of the performance of the Ismail Haniyeh government reaches 36 percent while if elections were held today, Haniyeh would receive up to 36 percent of the vote.”¹⁹ Additionally, as a result of isolation and the direct effects of the blockade on the people, Hamas has further consolidated its power by clamping down on media-sources and thus consolidated power in turn censoring any criticism and only projecting the economic woes caused by the blockade. For instance, circulation of the Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Al-Ayyam, and Al-Quds newspapers was prevented from entering by the Gaza police.²⁰ Daniel Byman is very explicit in saying that:

“the siege has failed at another level: it has not weakened Hamas... Today, Hamas has an unquestioned – and, in the eyes of most Gazans, largely legitimate – monopoly on the use of force and its political clout among Palestinians has grown at the expense of Fatah.”²¹

The embargo and the blockade have brought economic hardship to the people of Gaza and Cuba by collectively punishing them with economic sanctions that have allowed the regimes to politically consolidate. Rather than causing a popular backlash on the incumbent regimes, the sanctions have instead earned them popularity for resisting and allowing them to have a “rally-around-the-flag” effect.

A second reason why economic sanctions have not succeeded in weakening or ousting the Hamas and Castro regimes is that both parties have found alternative channels to obtain resources. Israel and the U.S. expected the collapse of the targeted regimes by economically asphyxiating them, resulting in their inability to acquire the resources to fulfill their agendas, mainly providing for their populations. However, the sanctions did not contain strict mechanisms that could prevent Hamas and Cuba from obtaining resources through alternative channels. For instance, U.S. policy since the Cuban revolution has aimed to unsuccessfully eliminate Castro by closing its market to the U.S. only to see the Soviet Union counterbalance U.S. policies. For example, “President Eisenhower went on to cut the Cuban sugar quota on 6 July 1960 in an open and deliberate attempt to undermine Castro’s power. But the Soviet Union...stepped into the breach.”²²

From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, Cuba found in the Soviet Union a lucrative commercial partner and a long-term ally. Mark Katz highlights this relationship patently stating “the complete embargo by the U.S. of all trade with Cuba was offset by large-scale Soviet economic assistance.”²³

Moreover, the Soviet Union served as an economic and military sponsor of the Cuban regime by establishing a reciprocal commercial exchange of goods produced in Cuba to the Soviet Union, mainly sugar, and the Soviet Union provided the island with military equipment, consumer goods and many oil derivatives that the US refused to exchange. Huberman and Sweezy elaborate on this commercial exchange by explaining the rationale behind it:

...Cuba is a low-cost producer of sugar, perhaps the lowest-cost producer in the world...The Soviet Union is a low cost producer of the things Cuba is most in need of: oil, trucks and jeeps, tractors, machinery etc....It follows that... the Soviet Union can reduce the average cost of its sugar consumption by exchanging what Cuba needs for Cuban sugar...²⁴

Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Cuba was able to weather the disintegration of its main patron and continue to offset the embargo through non-American channels. Ironically, during the decade of the 1990’s Cuba opened its borders to inflows of capital deriving mainly from Europe that were channeled to the rise of the tourist industry providing the Cuban regime with a new source of income. In 2000, with the rise of Hugo Chavez and Venezuela’s energetic power, Cuba saw the rise of what would become its principal commercial patron in exchange for its qualified human capital. Thus, the outcome of the flourished Cuban-Venezuelan relations took the form of the “oil-for-doctors” relations, allowing Cuba to offset the absence of the Soviet Union and the embargo:

...Caracas provided the critical lifeline in the energy field: Venezuelan oil reenergized vital sectors of the island’s economy, ending the enervating blackouts of the Special Period. Economic growth had reached 11.8 percent by 2005 and has remained at a respectable level since...According to direct agreements between Havana and Caracas, Cuba receives 90,000 barrels of oil a day largely in exchange for over 30,000 doctors and medical personnel and specialists in fields such as education and sports.²⁵

The Hamas regime, considering the economic difficulty of earning an income caused by the inability to engage in private and external economic activity as a result of the air, land and sea restrictions and the drastic reduction of international aid also pursued alternative resource channels. By preventing the arrival of merchant ships and aircraft, a new source of income has emerged in the development and taxing of the “tunnel trade.” Hundreds of tunnels, running mainly between Gaza and Egypt, not only employ about 40,000 people but also, the tunnel trade is estimated to have earned Hamas up to \$200 million in taxes.²⁶ Moreover, due to the inability of merchants to engage in official commercial exchanges and the unwillingness of the Quartet countries to economically engage the Gaza administra-

tion, Hamas has sought to strengthen its financial standing by, paradoxically, acquiring more funds externally. To appeal to foreign actors for economic support, Hamas has attracted financial donations by means of its reputation as a charity – Dawa activity.²⁷ Hamas receives funding from a variety of external actors, including Iran, Palestinian expatriates, private benefactors in Saudi Arabia, charities and associations operating in the Palestinian territories and communities in Europe and North America as well as other Arab states. A significant portion of funds derives from the Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabian sources amounting to a total value of \$12 million a year.²⁸ Moreover, according to Matthew Levitt, Hamas, based on Israeli and Canadian intelligence, receives between \$3 and \$18 million a year from Iran.²⁹ Also, through organizations such as The Palestine Relief and Development Fund (Interpal) in Great Britain, The Holyland Foundation (HLF) in the U.S., the Al Aqsa Foundation in Germany, Holland, Belgium and Denmark and the Comité de Bienfaisance et Solidarité avec la Palestine in France, Hamas has been able to obtain more funds.³⁰

Additionally, countries friendly to Hamas such as Syria provide its leadership with refuge for its militants, and space to train combatants and organize its financial and military strategies. Lastly, funds transferred to the Palestinian Authority are channeled through specific semi-institutions in Gaza with no direct connections to Hamas that benefit the people in Gaza. Institutions of this kind include: the Coastal Municipal Water Utility, an independent water utility responsible for managing all water and wastewater systems in Gaza that has received over \$60 million in funding for projects and institutional development; the NGO Development Center a Palestinian NGO that manages and allocates \$28 million in grants to NGOs, with at least 40 percent of NDC's funding going to Gaza; the Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF), an autonomous public institution managing \$115 million and with 40 percent of its programs in Gaza, was established to support municipalities in fulfilling their mandate as front line service providers by financing infrastructure investments, costs for critical services for the public and provides technical assistance to municipalities to improve their management.³¹ Also, the United Nations, through the United Nations Reliefs Work Agency, funds numerous social projects. Paradoxically, another source of income for the people of Gaza has been the payment of salaries for certain public-sectors employees not to work (for the Hamas government) by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.³²

Gaza and Cuba have confronted, and continue to confront, numerous obstacles to finance government expenditures as a result of the economic sanctions. However, with diverging and innovative financing strategies they have been able to offset the sanctioning policies to a high degree by obtaining alternative resources mainly from external actors. This has allowed both regimes to evade the full impact of the economic sanctions and not face any significant domestic threat by receiving external aid thus enabling the Gaza and Cuban administrations to reasonably advance their agendas and consolidate their grip on power.

Lastly, both the embargo and the blockade have failed to weaken or oust the regimes as a result of international campaigns pursued by the Gaza and Cuban regimes. These campaigns have been centered on direct and indirect effects of the economic sanctions and have been beneficial to the Castro and Hamas governments by diverting attention from their domestic problems and instead have provided them with greater legitimacy to their claims against the blockade and the embargo. For instance, since 1992 and promoted by the Cuban government, the UN General Assembly holds an annual resolution calling for the United States to lift the longstanding economic embargo. The outcome on each vote has been an overwhelming diplomatic victory for the Cuban government. First, since 1992, no more than four countries have supported the resolution – this year only the U.S. and Israel voted against it.³³ On the contrary, the Castro dictatorship has seen every year an increasing amount of countries voting in favor of the embargo's lift with 59 on the first resolution and 187 this past year. The UN resolution has allowed Castro and his government to draw attention to the futility of the embargo and to highlight the negative effects of the embargo.

The Elian Gonzalez case presented another diplomatic victory that united Cubans and strengthened the position of the regime while diverting attention from Cubans' continued deprivation of basic freedoms. On November 25, 1999, Elian, a five-year-old Cuban boy, reached Florida shores on an inner tube, following a ship-wreck in which his mother perished in the open seas. Immediately, Elián became a rallying symbol for Miami Cubans, a large number of whom mounted a major campaign to retain the boy in the United States under the custody of relatives. The reaction in Cuba was rapid and furious. Led personally by Fidel Castro, and the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC), a nation-wide well-orchestrated campaign to rally Cubans was put in motion in support of Elián's return to

his father who had stayed on the island. Huge mass mobilizations now became part of routine life in Cuba and in June 2000 Elian returned. The importance of the campaign for bolstering Castro's regime was significant. As described by Mauricio Font:

The campaign to gain custody of Elián as well as its outcome turned out to be a major political success for Castro personally and for his regime. The mobilizations rallied many Cubans around their national leader, once again. The outcome confirmed the regime's claims to legality, and authorities basked in their ability to "protect a Cuban child against injustice."³⁴

In Gaza, the blockade has been enacted for over four years causing great peril to the people of Gaza. Consequently, in recent years, humanitarian aid groups have sent aid ships and activists to Gaza to lessen the suffering of Gazans fearing possible reprisal by Israeli authorities. The Freedom Flotilla is a very but particularly instructive example, which Hamas strongly supported. Prior to the assault the Flotilla suffered, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said, "the meaning of the flotilla is that the entire world opposes the siege on the Gaza Strip, and if Israel behaves like pirates and sea-terrorists – we will win."³⁵ Meanwhile, Israel acknowledged the campaign in favor of the Flotilla with Foreign Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman saying, "the aid convoy is violent propaganda against Israel..."³⁶ The outcome of the Flotilla resulted, according to Haniyeh's calculation, in an Israeli assault and a diplomatic and rhetorical victory for Hamas. The assault by Israeli commandos resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American, benefiting Hamas politically as a result of widespread international condemnations to the assault that delegitimized the blockade.

The international condemnation of the Israeli raid on the flotilla was possibly unprecedented in its severity... One of the beneficiaries of the raid will be Hamas. The main perception after the raid was that the blockade policy had failed and could not be continued, so any easing of the blockade will be seen as a victory for Hamas in its confrontation with Israel.³⁷

The Freedom Flotilla event represented a victory for Hamas by reflecting the failure of the blockade and divert-

ing attention from Hamas' internal authoritarian tendencies allowing Hamas to escape greater scrutiny. Interestingly, Israel agreed to ease the blockade a month after the attack. It lifted its ban on most consumer goods despite maintaining restrictions on many construction materials and "dual use" items.³⁸ Moreover, the Hamas regime has seen an indirect benefit from the international campaign that has emerged with diverging actors denouncing the illegality of the blockade. For instance, the U.N. Human Rights Chief, Navi Pillay, stated that the Gaza blockade is illegal because it amounts to collective punishment of civilians, which is prohibited under the Geneva Conventions and cited the conventions' requirement that "no protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited."³⁹ Moreover, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a traditionally neutral organization, declared that:

"the whole of Gaza's civilian population is being punished for acts for which they bear no responsibility. The closure therefore constitutes a collective punishment imposed in clear violation of Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law."⁴⁰ These aforementioned non-orchestrated declarations have indirectly aided Hamas at discrediting the blockade.

Implications & Conclusion

Researchers at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. recently released the third edition of their highly regarded book-length study on economic sanctions, examining over 170 cases in the last century. Their main conclusion: sanctions have accomplished their proclaimed objective in only about a third of all cases – and most of those involved goals far more modest than regime change.⁴¹ With this evidence, what is the purpose of maintaining policies that have proven unsuccessful? There is a growing international consensus on the futility of the embargo and the blockade and the economic hardship they have fostered while simultaneously reaping political benefits to the incumbent governments. Consequently, the U.S. and Israeli government must revise their policies, which have delegitimized the U.S. and Israel while legitimizing the oppressive Hamas and Castro leaderships. The embargo and the blockade have served as a scapegoat for Hamas and Castro who employ them as an

excuse for their own failings. In Cuba, almost fifty years of embargo and Castro rule uphold the urgent necessity to repeal the embargo. The embargo has shielded the island from democratic and market economy forces, which could eventually be embraced by the Cuban people in an embargo-free scenario and increase domestic demand for regime change. Although the recent Republican victory in the legislative election and the highly influential Cuban-American community will not facilitate further openings towards Cuba by President Obama, U.S. politicians must struggle to repeal the embargo.⁴² Allowing American tourists and companies will not only aid Cubans but will also benefit the U.S. politically and economically. Trends among Cuban-Americans seem to be shifting as reflected by a poll of Cuban-Americans in Florida's Miami-Dade County that found that 55 percent of the respondents were in favor of lifting the embargo. In Gaza, described by conservative British PM David Cameron as a "prison camp", Israel must repeal the near-total blockade, which has dehumanized Gazans while harnessing Hamas greater power and legitimacy. Israel must focus on achieving a higher degree of security rather than overthrowing Hamas. To do so Israel and its allies must engage Hamas, as Dr. Larbi Sadiki says by "investing more soft power in Gaza to lure Gazans and Hamas to the negotiating table, and unburdening Israel and Egypt of their dehumanizing tactics."⁴³ Israel must also find a mechanism by which to ensure that arms imports do not rearm Hamas without inflicting extreme humanitarian damage.

This essay has emphasized that the embargo and the blockade have failed at weakening and/or ousting the Hamas and Castro regimes, but rather have instead bolstered the leadership's legitimacy and allowed them to thus consolidate power. The ruling elites have countered the rationale for the imposition of economic sanctions by emphasizing the detrimental socioeconomic effects of the policies on ordinary Cubans and Gazans, have found alternative sources of income through patron-client relationships with other countries and actors, and have carried out international efforts to further undermine the legitimacy of the policies.

¹ Steven Erlanger.

² Carol Migdalovitz, p. 1

³ Susanne Gratius, p. 9

⁴ Susanne Gratius p. 9.

⁵ Salim Lamrani

⁶ Granma Newspaper

⁷ W. T. Whitney Jr.

⁸ Una de Cal y otra de arena de Obama <http://hablemosdeeso.wordpress.com/tag/internacional/>

.com/tag/internacional/

⁹ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

¹⁰ Fidel Castro Speech at the decoration ceremony for the mothers and wives of the five Heroes of the Republic of Cuba

¹¹ Jorge I. Domínguez p. 103

¹² Reuters

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ UN Special Focus August 2009 p. 2

¹⁵ UN Special Focus August 2009 p. 3-4

¹⁶ UN Special Focus August 2010 p. 24

¹⁷ Sara Roy p.123

¹⁸ Ivan Eland

¹⁹ PSR Survey Research Unit

²⁰ Committee to Protect Journalists

²¹ Daniel Byman p. 52

²² Peter Shearman p. 9

²³ Mark Katz p. 101

²⁴ Huberman and Sweezy in Kosmas Tsokhas p. 323

²⁵ Max Azicri p. 99-100

²⁶ Daniel Byman p. 53

²⁷ Globalsecurity.org; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-funds.htm>

²⁸ Israel Security Sources.

²⁹ Matthew Levitt p. 4

³⁰ Israel Security Sources

³¹ International Conference In Support Of The Palestinian Economy For The Reconstruction Of Gaza p. 13-15

³² Sara Roy p. 125

³³ Neil MacFarquhar

³⁴ Mauricio Font p. 48

³⁵ Haaretz.com

³⁶ Haaretz.com

³⁷ Ben Smith and Arabella Thorp p. 12

³⁸ The Guardian

³⁹ Fox News

⁴⁰ BBC

⁴¹ Vince Beiser

⁴² Foreign Policy

⁴³ Larbi Sadiki

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